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Article 5

NOTES
Eminent Domain
PROCEDURE UNDER Ta DECLARATION OF TAKING ACT
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of Law; nor shall private property -be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.

In condemnation proceedings this clause has served only as an
acknowledgment of a limitation upon the right of the sovereign, and
not as the constitutional basis for recognizing the right of eminent
domain. In 1876, Justice Strong, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States,' referred to eminent domain
as "the offspring of political necessity" and thereafter courts have
repeatedly declared the right of eminent domain to be an incident
2
of sovereignty, requiring no constitutional recognition. Although the
of
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the
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and the
payment
the
because
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possession
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taking are not simultaneous. 3 Similarly, with reference to the vesting
of title prior to compensation, early Supreme Court authority 4 doubting the constitutionality of this procedure has been effectively repud5
iated where the amount of the ultimate award has been allocated.
I.

The Declaration of Taking Act 6 is the statutory scheme which
enables the Federal Government to take immediate title to and possession of land, while safeguarding the private landowner's right to
just compensation. Passed in the early depression environment of
1931, the direct purpose of the law was to expedite the taking of title
to and possession of lands to be used as sites for public works.
Immediate taking, accomplished by filing the declaration and deposit1
2

91 U.S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449, 451 (1876).

E.g., Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 43 S. Ct. 442,
444, 67 L. Ed. 809 (1923); City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959,
963 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86 L. Ed. 1753
(1942); Hessel v. A. Smith & Co., 15 F. Supp. 953, 957 (E.D. Ill. 1936).

3

Cherokee Nation v.. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S. Ct.

965, 34 L. Ed. 295 (1890).

4 Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196, 204, 22 L. Ed. 612 (U.S. 1875).
5 Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 16 S. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188 (1895). And only
one state constitution containing a provision similar to the Fifth Amendment has
been construed to require actual payment of compensation before any taking.
Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211, 98 N.E. (2d)
730 (1951), discussed in Note, 30 CmKi-N Ray. 142 (1952).
6 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-258e (1946).
(423)
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ing the estimated compensation with the court, eliminated the delay
usually connected with litigation on the just compensation question.
The acceleration of public construction programs was aimed at relieving the unemployment problem conspicuously pressing at that
time. 7 The Act allowed the executive department to irrevocably bind
the Government to payment of the final award. The resulting vested
right to just compensation was viewed as a complete compliance with
constitutional requirements. 8 Prior to the Act, condemnation proceedings in federal courts were generally ruled by state procedure. Only
recently, after much debate, was this heterogeneous usage changed. 9
Many states permitted immediate taking where compensation was
pledged; thus the Act was the codification of existent but previously
unused procedure.' 0 Section 4 of the Act proclaims the law to be
supplementary to existing governmental powers in condemnation actions. While eminent domain is generally referred to as a concomitant
of sovereignty, in practical operation the efficient use of the power
depends greatly on the 1931 Act.'1 Efficacious Government action
for the common good becomes a clear necessity in national emergencies.
That this Act is an important efficiency device is demonstrated by the
recent amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 which
12
added the declaration of taking procedure.
Although the right to eminent domain is an inherent power of the
sovereign, this power lies dormant until specific statutes set out the
occasions and conditions for its exercise. 13 In this light the Declaration
of Taking Act operates only as an auxiliary statute. In itself it affords
no authority to initiate condemnation proceedings; it is a companionate or subsequent procedural device. To illustrate: the Atomic
Energy Commission as a federal agency has the power of condemnation
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.14 In a condemnation proceeding by the Commission's officers, the Atomic Energy Act would
7 H.R. RaP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1930); SEN. REP. No. 1325,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1931); 74 CoNG. RFc. 777 (1930). The reports on a
similar bill pertaining to the District of Columbia also contain pertinent references
to the raison d'etre of this type legislation. H.R. REP. No. 1693, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-4 (1928) ; SEN. REP. No. 1431, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1929).
8 Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 16 S. Ct. 43, 51, 40 L. Ed. 188 (1895).
9 FED. R. Crv. P. 71(a) (effective Aug. 1, 1951). See the collection of
materials in 11 F.R.D. 213 (1951), and in Clark, The Proposed Condemnation
Rule, 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 1 (1949).
10 H.R. RaP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1930); Smp. RFP. No.
1325, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1931).
11 Clark, supra note 9, at 2-3. Judge Clark notes the importance of this
Act as a background to any discussion of condemnation procedure.
12 The Amendments were enacted July 31, 1951. Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 101 et seq. (July 31, 1951).
13 Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 23 Wall. 108, 23 L. Ed. 67 (U.S.
1874); United States v. Parcel of Land, 100 F. Supp. 498, 504 (D. D.C. 1951).
14 60 STAT. 771-2, 42 U.S.C. § 1812 (a) (5), § 1813(b) (1946).
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vest the Commission with the requisite authority for filing the petition.
Then, depending upon the discretion of the Commission, a declaration
of taking could be filed pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act.
Of course, both petitions could be filed simultaneously, but the latter
would derive its operative effect from the former.
The Act provides that the declaration of taking shall contain or
have annexed thereto: 15
(1) A statement of the authority under which and the public use for
which said lands are taken.
(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for the identification
thereof.
(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken for public
use.
(4) A plan showing the lands taken.
(5) A statement of the sum of money estimated by said acquiring
authority to be just compensation for the land taken.
After the petition has been filed and the estimated compensation
deposited into court, the interest in the land, whether it be a fee
simple absolute or a lesser estate, immediately vests in the United
States, and upon application to the court the petitioning federal agency
may also have immediate possession. 16 As a corollary, upon the filing
7
of the petition the right to just compensation vests in the landowner."
II.

Notwithstanding early Supreme Court decisions 18 upholding statutes which allowed the sovereign possession and title prior to final
judgment, the constitutionality of the Act was judicially challenged
in Hessel v. A. Smith & Co.19 There the Government, after initiation
of condemnation proceedings but prior to final judgment, awarded
the defendant the contractual right to demolish the improvements
on the premises. The contention of the plaintiff-landowner, in his plea
for an injunction until the rendition of the ultimate award, was that
the Act was violative of the Fifth Amendment. Summary disposition
of this argument resulted when the court declared that the provision
for just compensation did not require actual payment in advance of
15 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946).
16 Ibid. Where the United States makes an absolute taking, it acquires "a
clear title to everything as of the date of the taking." United States v. 53 1/4

Acres of Land, 176 F. (2d) 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1949).
17 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946). provides: "Upon the filing
said declaration of taking and of the deposit . . . the right to just compensation
for the same [the lands] shall vest in the persons entitled thereto. .. ."
18 Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 16 S. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188 (1895) (state
statute); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 10 S. Ct.
965, 34 L. Ed. 295 (1890) (federal statute).
19 15 F. Supp. 953 (ED. Ill. 1936).
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the occupancy of the land. With respect to the taking of title, the
court concluded that the owner's constitutional prerogative remained
intact since the Act provided that: (a) an estimated amount of compensation must be deposited in the court; (b) for any deficiency, the
Government is assessed interest at six percent; and (c) upon application to the court, the owner may withdraw the compensation deposited
there without prejudice to a subsequent jury trial on the issue of
just compensation. Only on one other occasion has validity of the Act
been seriously challenged; 20 nowhere has the Supreme Court directly
passed upon this issue.
A possible corollary of the right to immediate possession has, however, received two distinctly conflicting interpretations by the district
courts in recent cases. The situation arises when the statute vesting
power in a federal agency to initiate condemnation proceedings does
not expressly provide for the right to immediate possession. Must the
Government pursuant to or contemporaneously with the main petition
file a declaration of taking? Assuming of course that there are
provisions for just compensation, has the Declaration of Taking Act
abrogated the court's inherent power to grant immediate possession
without specific statutory authority? In United States v. Fisk Building,21 the court, admitting that the question was not free from doubt,
held that the pre-existing power of the court had not been supplanted
by the Act. Since the court could not see a clear legislative intent to
change the decisional law 22 on this point, it concluded that immediate
possession could be granted without specific statutory authority. A
contrary result was attained in United States v. Parcel of Land 23
where the Government's motion for an order for the immediate taking
of possession was denied. It is interesting to note that this decision
was also based on an interpretation of the legislative intent. The
Government had asserted that the Act was not intended to abrogate,
limit, or modify the court's inherent power to grant possession. Answering this statement, the decision cited Catlin v. United States 24 where
20

City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959 (9th Cir. 1942), cert.

denied, 316 U.S. 679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86 L. Ed. 1753 (1942).
21 99 F. Supp. 592, 595 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
22 Commercial Station Post Office, Inc. v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 183 (8th
Cir. 1931) ; see City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959 (9th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86. L. Ed. 1753 (1942); Hessel v. A.

Smith & Co., 15 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
23 100 F. Supp. 498 (D. D.C. 1951). It is important to note that this case
does not expressly come under 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-258e
(1946), but rather under 45 STAT. 1415 (1929), 40 U.S.C. §§ 361 et seq. (1946),

now covered

by D.C. CODE § 16-619

to §

16-644 (1940).

The

Declaration

of

Taking Act was patterned after the 1929 Act passed in the District of Columbia.
The legislative intent on the essential features of both Acts is similar. See in this

respect, H.R. REP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1930); SEN. RFP. No.
1325, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1931).
24 324 U.S. 229, 239, 65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945).

NOTES
the Supreme Court, with reference to the Act, spoke of it as "the
additional right conferred 'to take possession and title in advance of
final judgment."'
Both district court opinions discussed Commercial Station Post
Office, Inc. v. United States.2 5 While this case directly supports the
Fisk Building decision, its one distinguishing feature is that the taking
of the particular land by condemnation proceedings was specifically
authorized by statute.2 6 This was not, however, of deciding influence
in United States v. Parcel of Land; the weight of the Act, supported
by the legislative intent, constrained the court to hold that to acquire
immediate possession there must be express statutory authority. Perhaps this conflict will be resolved by the courts in due time by
declaring that since the Act was designed to provide merely an optional
and supplementary proceeding, to require its utilization when not
desired by the Government would be startling and temerarious.
III.
When the Federal Government proceeds under a declaration of
taking, an attack on the good faith of the Government by the individual landowner is ineffective to vacate the declaration.2 7 or to alter the
estimated award. 28 Mere filing of the declaration carries with it the
presumption of a valid public necessity.2 9 While the declaration must
aver that the agency has authority and that the use of the property
will be a public use, the failure to state proper authority does not go
to the jurisdiction of the district court, although it can be a defense
if pleaded timely.30 The title taken is as set forth in the declaration.
Thus where the Government took an absolute fee, easement servitudes
to which it did not take subject were extinguished, and an attempt by
the Government to exclude one of the servitudes by amendment of
the declaration was unsuccessful. 3l Generally after filing the declaration
and paying the estimated amount of compensation into the registry
48 F. (2d) 183 (8th Cir. 1931).
45 STAT. 1661 (1929).
United States v. 6.74 Acres of Land, 148 F. (2d) 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1945).
United States v. 48,752.77 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 563, 564-5 (D.
Neb. 1943).
29 United States v. 40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F. Supp. 239, 245 (N.D.Ill.
25
26
27
28

1948).

30 United States v.Nudelman, 104 F. (2d) 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 589, 60 S.Ct. 115, 84 L. Ed. 493 (1939).
31 United States v. Sunset Cemetery Co., 132 F. (2d) 163 (7th Cir. 1943).
Amendments in the Government's estimate of just compensation have been
allowed in accord with the court's inherent power to permit timely amendments
of defective pleadings when no violence is done to the landowner's vested right
to a fair award. United States v. 1,997.66 Acres of Land, 137 F. (2d) 8 (8th Cir.
1943). Once the declaration is filed and title has vested, the district court is
powerless to dismiss the action. United States v. Hayes, 172 F. (2d) 677 (9th
Cir. 1949).
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of the court, a judgment on the declaration is rendered. This common
practice allows the Government to hold the land under a muniment
of title. 32 The usual process after judgment on the declaration involves
payment of the estimated sum to the landowner followed shortly
33
thereafter by an extended jury trial on, the just compensation issue.
34
In Catlin v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a judgment
on the declaration was not a final appealable order since no hearing
on the merits had been conducted. When the Government moves by
ex parte order to expedite taking, Section 2 of the Act prevents delays
by prohibiting premature appeals.3 5
When the Government exercises its condemnation powers, the
36
landowner's claim for compensation arises at the time of the taking.
Obviously, the determination of the time of taking is important, for
the landowner at that instant, rather than at a prior or subsequent
time, has the right to assert the claim. Under the Act the problem
arises whenever the Government files a declaration of taking after
having acquired possession of the property. In Anderson v. United
States,37 condemnation proceedings were instituted under the River
and Harbor Act of 1918,38 and on the same day an order of the
court granting immediate possession was issued. Several months later,
after a marked increase in market value of the property, the Government filed a declaration of taking and deposited an estimated amount
of compensation. The court held that by invoking the Act the Government did not abrogate its original suit, but merely took a further step
in a suit already begun. Compensation was computed on the value
of the property as of the date possession was acquired, rather than as
of the date the declaration was filed.
Admittedly this view accords with common sense and follows from
the statement that the Declaration of Taking Act operates only as an
auxiliary pleading. However, the case might be considered at variance
39
with the rule stated in United States v. 150.29 Acres of Land. Procourt
the
When
exception.
one
with
same,
the
were
facts
cedurally the
32 United States v. 72 Acres of Land, 37 F. Supp. 297, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1941),
aff'd sub nom. City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959 (9th Cir. 1942),

cert. denied,

316 U.S. 679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86 L. Ed. 1753 (1942). However, such

judgments from the standpoint of vesting title are wholly unnecessary. United
States v. Sunset Cemetery Co., 132 F. (2d) 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1943).
33 See Cobo, City Treasurer v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 351 (6th Cir. 1938).
34 324 U.S. 229, 243, 65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945).
35 Id., 324 U.S. at 237-8.
36 Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283, 60 S. Ct. 231, 84 L. Ed. 240
(1939).
37 179 F. (2d) 281 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965, 70 S. Ct.
1000, 94 L. Ed. 1373 (1950).
38 40 STAT. 911 (1918), 33 U.S.C. § 594 (1946).
39 135 F. (2d) 878 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 882, 65 S. Ct.
1576, 89 L. Ed. 1998 (1945).
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granted the order for immediate possession, the Government could
only occupy part of the land at that time. The question of "taking"
was40raised when a Wisconsin tax lien was asserted against the property. The court declared that the Act was "clear" upon this point and
held that the taking occurred when the declaration of taking was
filed. Since the point was made that the Government acquired only
partial possession of the property and not the totality, the ruling
would suggest only a limitation upon, and not a clash with, the Anderson view. Where the Government had obtained the land by contract
which stated that the value of the land was to be determined as of
the date of the contract, subsequent condemnation proceedings with
a declaration of taking did not effect a change in the contract fixing
the value of the land. 4 1 The date of taking was governed by the
contract, although prior to condemnation proceedings.
IV.
Conceding that value at the time of taking is the measure of
compensation, nevertheless the formula for arriving at such an amount
is in nowise algebraic. In its more commercial sense, just compensation
has been defined as the "full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken." 42 But the formula designed to determine this equivalent has been expressed as the "fair market value" of the land, or the
amount in cash a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller. 43 Yet,
despite the "willingness" between the hypothetical seller and buyer,
the scales of justice seem to overlook the "equivalent in money" when
the courts state that the guarantee of just compensation is "for the
property, and not to the owner." 44 Payment is made only for the
property taken; the consequential losses to the owner are not con45
sidered.
Where condemnation proceedings, not under the Act, are initiated
and the taking of possession precedes the payment to the landowner,
40 With reference to the United States, the court stated that it was immaterial when the Wisconsin tax lien attached. Due to the express prohibition
in the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. II, § 2, and also because of the theory of dual
sovereignty, the State of Wisconsin was prevented from taxing the property of the
United States Government. The question was whether the lien attached to the
fund deposited into the court - thus requiring a ruling as to the taking.
41 Bank of Edenton v. United States, 152 F. (2d) 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1945).
42 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374, 63 S. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336
(1943).
43 Ibid.
44 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct.
622, 626, 37 L. Ed. 463 (1893).
45 United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282, 63 S. Ct. 1047, 87 L. Ed.
1390 (1943). Cf. United States v. Certain Lands in City of Newark, 183 F. (2d)
320, 321 (3d Cir. 1950); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 391, 396 (1st Cir.
1944), cert. dended, 323 U.S. 772, 65 S. Ct. 131, 89 L. Ed. 618 (1944).
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he is held to be entitled to interest from the date of the taking to
the payment of the award. 46 This constitutional right has been
expressly stated in the Declaration of Taking Act 47 which provides
that just compensation shall include six percent interest per annum,
on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the
date of taking, from said date to the date of payment. It also expressly
declares that interest shall not be allowed on so much of the award
as shall have been paid into court. Where such interest is allowed,
it is not allowed "for the purpose of increasing the compensation, but
as a part of the compensation as of the time of taking where delay
has occurred in judicially arriving at the amount of compensation
and the payment thereof." 48
In Oliver v. United States, 49 this question of awarding interest payments was decided against the landowner. Prior to the condemnation
proceedings and the filing of a declaration of taking, the Government
had contracted for the purchase of the land.50 The contract allowed
the Government to acquire the land by condemnation if the title to
the land should be unsatisfactory, but the valuation of the land was
to be controlled by the provisions of the contract. When the declaration of taking was filed, the estimated compensation was much lower
than stated in the contract. The landowners asserted the validity of
the contract and requested the court to grant them interest at the
rate of six percent per annum from the date of the acceptance of the
contract by the Government until the balance of the compensation
had also been deposited. The request for interest was denied, 51 for
the court held that by asserting the validity of the land contract, the
landowners were bound by the terms of the contract which contained
52
no stipulation as to interest.
Not only was one of the objectives of the Act to absolve the United
States from liability for interest payments after depositing the esti46 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354,
67 L. Ed. 664 (1923). It is not truly interest in the commercial sense but is
considered the proper additional sum required to give "just compensation" in
case of delay in payment - a rather nebulous distinction at best.
47 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946).
48 United States v. Certain Land in City of St. Louis, 58 F. Supp. 305
(E.D. Mo. 1944).
49 155 F. (2d) 73 (8th Cir. 1946).
50 The validity of these contracts was finally settled in Muschany v. United
States, 324 U.S. 49, 65 S. Ct. 442, F9 L. Ed.744 (1945).
51 Where a stipulation to pay interest is missing, or in the absence of a
statute allowing it, no interest can be recovered against the United States on
unpaid contract claims. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. Ed. 664 (1923); United States v. Certain Land in City of
St. Louis, 58 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Mo. 1944); United States v. 17,280 Acres of
Land, 57 F. Supp. 745, 746 (D. Neb. 1944).
52 This question was presented in Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599,
67 S. Ct. 606, 91 L. Ed. 532 (1947). There the Court affirmed the Oliver case
and impliedly overruled United States v. Baugh, 149 F. (2d) 190 (5th Cir. 1945).
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mated award in the court, but an equally beneficial objective was to
make the compensation readily available to the landowner. 53 Manifestly, the intention of the legislature was that the amount deposited
should be immediately paid to the person so entitled, either the entire
amount, 54 or his proportionate share, however small. 55 Naturally,
every person having either an interest at law or in equity is entitled
to share in the award. 56
A possible defect in the Act, revealing a safeguard for the landowner,
is that while it provides for a deficiency judgment against the United
States where the final award is greater than the estimated deposit, it is
conspicuous in its failure to provide for the situation that might arise
where the final award is less than the deposit. Is the Government's
estimation a bar to its claim that the property is worth less than
the amount stated in the declaration? 57 At least one case has shown
the discretion of the court in utilizing its power of appellate remittitur.58

Once the Government has deposited the money into the registry
of the court and has taken title, the problem of the distribution of
the fund is left with the court. 59 The Government, as condemner, has
discharged its obligation and is not immediately or directly concerned
with the distribution.6" However, the functional disposition of the
compensation to those legally entitled to it is clearly an objective
of the Act; from the initiation of the proceedings to the final distribution, there is to be only one "continuous integrated process of litigation." 61 Although the court has the duty to properly distribute the
53

United States v. 17,280 Acres of Land, 57 F. Supp. 745, 746 (D. Neb.

1944).
54 United States v. Certain Lands in the Borough of Brooklyn, 39 F. Supp.
91,94 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
55 Id. at 99.
56 Swanson v. United States, 156 F. (2d) 442 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied
sub nom. Spokane Portland Cement Co. v. Swanson, 329 U.S. 800, 67 S. Ct. 492,
91 L. Ed. 684 (1947).
57 See United States v. 17,280 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 267 (D. Neb.

1942), for a discussion of this problem.
5 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 149 F. (2d)

81, 83 (5th Cir.

1945).
59 United States v. 19,573.39 Acres of Land in Cheyenne County, 70 F.
Supp. 610, 612 (D. Neb. 1947), aff'd sub nom. State of Nebraska v. United
States, 164 F.(2d) 866 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 815, 68 S. Ct. 1070,
92 L. Ed. 1745 (1948); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince
George's County, 40 F. Supp. 436, 443 (D. Md. 1941).
60 Ibid.
61 Hopkins v. McClure, 148 F. (2d) 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1945) (petition to
intervene to assert a lien on an alimony judgment allowed); Swanson v. United
States, 156 F. (2d) 442 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied sub nom. Spokane Portland
Cement Co. v. Swanson, 329 U.S. 800, 67 S. Ct. 492, 91 L. Ed. 684 (1947)
(mortgagee's right to the fund allowed).
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funds, the court is not an investigator; the Government must supply
the complete list of persons entitled to share in the award. Where
this is done, if the court should make a mistake in the distribution,
the remedy would be by appeal; no claim against the United States
62
could be asserted.
In resolving claims for liens and other charges out of the deposited
fund, the court exercises a general equitable function. 63 When the
money is placed in the registry of the court at the time of the declaration, it stands in place of the land and from it claims of lienholders are satisfied. This satisfaction applies only to liens which
had vested when the United States took title.6 4 All liens must be
existent and not mere potentialities. 65 Reasonable attorneys' fees are
properly chargeable against the sum deposited. 66 A lienholder with
a valid claim cannot be deprived of his day in court to assert his
right. Whether he is a necessary party in condemnation proceedings
is immaterial as far as his constitutional right to just compensation
67
is concerned, as long as his interest is protected in a practical manner.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the Declaration of Taking Act serves as a helpful
auxiliary to the federal power of eminent domain. Constitutionally
sound, the Act seeks to mollify the friction between Government and
landowner. The Government immediately acquires title to the land,
provided the compensation therefor is then available, via the court,
to the landowner. Provisions regulating interest on deficiency estimates
and the distribution of funds are also embraced within the terms of
the Act.
Although the need for expeditious acquisition of land during the
crises of national emergency and war is obvious, some might question
the use of the Act at other times. However, the benefits derived from
efficient condemnation for any lawful Government use, in war or
peace, should dispel any doubts concerning the perpetual propriety of
the Act. The Act affords the Federal Government a uniform, immed62 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince George's County, 40
F. Supp. 436, 443 (D. Md. 1941).
63 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946); United States v. Certain
Land in City of St. Louis, 29 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Mo. 1939).
64 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F.

(2d) 782 (3d Cir. 1942). The court cannot invalidate an entire state tax lien
or fix the amount of taxes due - local law governs this. Collector of Revenue
v. Ford Motor Co., 158 F. (2d) 354 (8th Cir. 1946).
65 People of Puerto Rico v. United States, 131 F. (2d) 151, 152 (1st Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 775, 63 S. Ct. 832, 87 L. Ed. 1144 (1943).
66 United States v. Moulton & Powell, 188 F. (2d) 865 (9th Cir. 1951).
67 Thibodo v. United States, 187 F. (2d) 249, 256 (9th Cir. 1951).

NOTES
late procedure, and the resultant reduction in expense, delay and
confusion, so often present in the former condemnation methods, is
indeed commendable. Available under this legislation is a procedure
which patently allows for, and should result in, Federal Government
efficiency.
William J. Hurley
Thomas Meaney, Jr.

Federal Statutes
GOVERNING FORFEITuRE
VEHICLES USED IN VIOLATING FEDERAL LAWS

OPERATION OF FEDERAL PROVISIONS

OF

Of great significance today because of an increasing number of
narcotics violations is 49 U.S.C. § 782.1 This statute provides that any
vessel, vehicle or aircraft which is used in violation of the narcotics 2
and counterfeiting laws 3 or the National Firearms Act, 4 or "upon, in,
or by means of which" a violation takes place, shall be forfeited. Specifically excepted is a vehicle whose owner can establish that the violation
was committed by one who had secured possession of the vehicle in
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state. The
liability of a common carrier is limited, in the case of a railway car or
engine, to situations in which the owner was, at the time of the violation, a consenting party or privy. The pilot, master, conductor,
driver or any other person in control as well as the owner, can subject
the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft to forfeiture. 5
The discussion here will be concerned primarily with the narcotics
phase of Section 782 operations as applied to vehicles, especially those
owned by innocent lienors, mortgagees and bailors.
The purpose of 49 U.S.C. § 782, as enunciated by the House Ways
and Means Committee, is to strike at the pocketbook of the criminal
and to deprive him of the "operating tools" of his "trade." 6 The
1 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1946). While the entire Chapter 11
in Title 49, i.e., §§ 781-8, governs forfeiture, Section 782 is the operative provision
and the others are merely ancillary to it. Thus only Section 782 will be referred
to in this note, except when specific clauses of the other Sections are called into
play.

INT. REv. CoDE §§ 2550-606.
3 35 STAT. 1115 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 262 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §471
et seq. (Supp. 1951).
4 48 STAT. 1236 (1934). This Act, still referred to in the text of Section 781,
was repealed by 53 STAT. 1 (1939) and is now incorporated in INT. RE.v. CODE
2

§2720.

5 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1946).
6 H.R. REP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
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Committee urged passage of the Act stating (1) that the existing
statute was inadequate; (2) that a new statute was necessary to
restrict the availability of transportation used to violate the narcotics
laws; and (3) that vehicles thus forfeited would be available to the
Federal Government for enforcing the laws. 7 However, the underlying
purpose is not always served because often it is not the pocketbook
of the criminal that suffers. The only remedy furnished innocent third
party lienors, mortgagees, or owner-bailors by the present Act is an
appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.8
Discussion of the instant law, particularly its remedial provisions,
focuses attention on latent problems, not unique to Section 782, which
arose under other statutes of similar harshness. 9 In contrast to these
are the mitigating provisions applied since 1935 in dealing with violations of the liquor laws.' 0
Ever since the adoption of the first forfeiture statutes, courts have
endeavored to determine the nature of a forfeiture proceeding - is
the owner or the object the defendant? Is the proceeding in personam
or in rem? Likewise courts have been faced with constitutional objections to the proceedings. When the user of the vehicle is its owner and
he has been acquitted or convicted in a prior criminal action, it has
been contended that the former proceeding violated the rule against
double jeopardy or that the matter was res judicata. 11 When the person
claiming an interest in the automobile is an innocent third party
(bailor, lienor, or mortgagee), a question of deprivation of property
without due process of law has been raised. 12 Problems peculiar to
Section 782 have grown out of the need for judicial definitions of
such terms as "vehicle" and "facilitation," since a vehicle used to
facilitate a violation becomes subject to forfeiture.
Insofar as the forfeiture provisions in 49 U.S.C. § 782 are similar
to those in other statutes, the solutions to the problems posed will
depend largely upon decisions under prior legislation. Therefore, before
discussing Section 782, a foundation should be laid by investigating
the cases under analogous statutes.
7 Id. at3.
8 53 STAT. 1292 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 784 (1946) provides that the remedies

under Section 782 shall be the same as those provided in the customs law.
46 STAT. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1946).
9 46 STAT. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1946) and REv. STAT.

§ 3078

(1875),

are two other laws which failed to provide remedies in district courts.
10

18 U.S.C. § 646 (1946).

11

See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397, 398, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed.

917 (1938) (collection of tax deficiency plus 50% thereof after acquittal on
charge of wilful evasion); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S. Ct. 437,
440-1, 29 L. Ed. 684 (1886).
12 See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466-7, 47 S. Ct. 133, 71 L. Ed.
354 (1926).

NOTES
I.
Since early in the history of the United States, the Supreme Court
has uniformly held that a libel for forfeiture under similar laws is an
in rem proceeding. 13 Upon that determination the constitutionality
of forfeiture provisions has been recognized. Speaking for the Supreme
Court in 1827, justice Story, in The Palmyra,14 said that the object
proceeded against was the wrongdoer. He distinguished between common law forfeiture, which was a species of punishment requiring a
prior conviction, and the in rem forfeiture created by statute.
In a prominent case, Dobbins v. United States,i 5 the Court surveyed
the decisions discussing the nature of the proceedings. In that case a
distillery had been used in violation of a liquor law. It was held, with
emphasis upon the admiralty origin of this concept, that the distillery
was the offender and the proceedings were in rem. The effect of this
holding cannot be over-emphasized.
In a more recent case, J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States,16 also under a liquor law, the Court discussed reasons 17 for
declaring the statute in violation of the Constitution, but was constrained by the long-standing rule and the Dobbins case to hold it
constitutional. It also reasoned that the necessities of the Federal
Government required that responsibility be placed upon the owner
18
and that the proceeding be in rem. The House Committee Report,
advising passage of Section 782, quoted from the Goldsmith case where
it was said:

'9

...
Congress interposes the care and xesponsibility of their owners in aid
of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to
the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong. In such case there is some analogy to the law of deodand....

But whether the reason for . . . [the statute] be artificial or real,
it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced.
13 The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535 (U.S. 1827); Various Items
of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580, 51 S. Ct. 282, 75 L. Ed.
558 (1931); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 41
S. Ct. 189, 191, 65 L. Ed. 376 (1921); Dobbins v. United States, 96 U.S.
395, 24 L. Ed. 637, 638 (1878).
14 12 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535 (U.S. 1827).
15 96 U.S. 395, 24 L. Ed. 637, 638-9 (1878).
16 254 U.S. 505, 41 S. Ct. 189, 65 L. Ed. 376 (1921).
17 Id., 41 S. Ct. at 190. It was argued that Congress, having in mind the
practices in the business world, intended only to punish the guilty and not to
deprive the innocent of their property.
18 H.R. RaP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939).
19 J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 41 S. Ct.
189, 191, 65 L. Ed. 376 (1921).
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In a similar vein it has been held that in a forfeiture action, it is the
property which is proceeded against through resort to legal fiction. 20
Accordingly, the property has been deemed guilty and condemned as
though conscious, instead of inanimate and insentient. (It is anomalous
that guilt of a crime be referred to in a discussion of a civil case, but
the terminology is that used by the Court.) The Court in Goldsmith
concluded that the original criminal prosecution was aimed directly
at the wrongdoer, but that the forfeiture proceeding was not part of
the punishment for the crime.
Under the forfeiture provisions of the customs laws, 2 ' it was held,
in an action brought by an innocent mortgagee, that the divesting of
the interest of third persons was not unconstitutional because the
forfeiture was directed against the thing and not against the interest
of the possessor in it.22 Under Section 782, the claim of an intervening
chattel mortgagee was likewise denied. 23 The registered owner, the
mortgagor, who was arrested possessing narcotics in the car, died before
being brought to trial. Again it was held that because the proceeding
was in rem, the ". . . innocence or want of knowledge of the lienor.
is no bar to the forfeiture." 24
II.

Coffey v. United States, 25 an 1886 Supreme Court decision which
has been much criticized 26 but never overruled, is the cause of much
confusion. There the question was raised whether a civil action for
forfeiture could be brought by the Government subsequent to conviction or acquittal in a criminal proceeding involving the same facts.
The Court stated: 27
. . . where an issue raised, as to the existence of the act or fact
denounced, has been tried in a criminal proceeding instituted by the
United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor
of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such
person on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States,
where, as against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the
matter in issue as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted
in such suit in rem.
20

Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581,

51 S. Ct. 282, 75 L. Ed. 558 (1931).
21 49 STAT. 526 (1935), 19 U.S.C. § 483 (1946).
22

United States v.Pacific Finance Corporation, 110 F. (2d) 732 (2d Cir.

1940).

23 United States v. One 1949 Lincoln Coupe Auto., 93 F. Supp. 666 (W.D.
Mich. 1950).
24 Id. at 669.

25

116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L. Ed. 684 (1886).

In United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F. (2d) 552, 553 (3d Cir. 1940),
the court said that ". . . only the shibboleth of 'stare decisis' has saved it from
express repudiation."
26

27

(1886).

Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S. Ct. 437, 440, 29 L. Ed. 684

NOTES
It was held that when the civil action for forfeiture was brought by
the Government, autrejois acquit properly applied and the action
28
should be dismissed.
The decision in the above case has been distinguished and its
application restricted by Stone v. United States.29 There the Court held
that even though the form of the forfeiture action in the Coffey case
was civil, in reality it was a criminal action, penal in nature, stating: 30
The rule established in Coffey's Case can have no application in a
civil case not involving any question of criminal intent, or of forfeiture for
prohibited acts, but turning wholly upon an issue as to the ownership of
property. . . . In the criminal case his acquittal may have been due
to the fact that the government failed to show beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of some fact essential to establish the offense charged,
while the same evidence in a civil action brought to recover the value
of the property illegally converted might have been sufficient to entitle
the government to a verdict.

The application of the Coffey rule was limited to the situation in
which a second criminal action was brought or personal punishment
attempted. The key to the Court's decision was the difference in the
degree of proof required in the criminal action and in the subsequent
civil action for forfeiture. Acquittal was held not to have decided
that the violation had not been committed, but merely that proof
thereof had failed. The Stone case was favorably noted in Helvering
v. Mitchell.3 ' And in two recent cases, 32 courts have adopted the
same restricted application favored in the Stone decision, relying
heavily upon the 33contention that the same parties were not present
in the two actions.
28 Accord: National Surety Co. v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 369 (9th Cir.
1927); United States v. One De Soto Sedan, 1946 Model, 85 F. Supp. 245 (E.D.
N.C. 1949). For an explanation and discussion of the quasi-criminal nature of
forfeiture as a basis for the decision in the Coffey case, see Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 534-5, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
29 167 U.S. 178, 17 S. Ct. 778, 42 L. Ed. 127 (1897); accord, Murphy v.
United States, 272 U.S. 630,47 S.Ct. 218, 71 L. Ed. 446 (1926).
30 Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 17 S. Ct. 778, 782, 42 L. Ed. 127
(1897).
31 303 U.S. 391, 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938).
32 United States v. Gramer, 191 F. (2d) 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1951); United
States v. One 1935 Model Pontiac Sedan Automobile, 105 F. (2d) 149, 150 (6th
Cir. 1939). The first was brought for violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act,
52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1946), and the latter under the liquor
laws, 53 STAT. 401 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3321 (1946).
33 This theory was further supported in Mitchell v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 89 F. (2d) 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1937): "The only rule necessarily
derivable from Coffey v. United States would seem to be that an acquittal in
a criminal prosecution is a bar to a civil action to enforce fines or forfeitures of
property wlicl are in their nature criminal penalties. Though this rule seems
hard to justify in view of the different degrees of proof required in order to
establish criminal guilt and civil responsibility, it is implicit in the
decision of Coffey v. United States which is binding on us in the absence of a
modification by the Supreme Court." [Emphasis supplied.]
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The question has been raised whether the fact that the second
case was a civil action would permit a second punishment, in the nature
of a penalty, on the same set of facts. 34 If the forfeiture is held a
punishment, the type of action cannot change that fact. "To hold
otherwise would be to sacrifice a great principle to the mere form of
procedure, and to render settlements with the Government delusive
and useless." 35
III.
It has been held that forfeiture of property for violation of internal
revenue and customs laws, regardless of ownership, innocence or
guilt, does not deprive an owner of his property without due process
of law. 36 In Logan v. United States,3 7 the court held it to be a settled
point of law
.. . that personal property voluntarily committed by the owner to the
possession of a third person, for use by him, becomes subject to forfeiture
* . . though the owner has no knowledge of the illegal use to which it is
put by the possessor.

In Van Oster v. Kansas,38 as a part of the contract of purchase of
an automobile, the vendor retained possession for use in his business.
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of due process
when the car was forfeited because one to whom it was loaned by the
dealer carried contraband liquor in it. It was found to be long settled
that the forfeiture of property entrusted by an innocent owner or
lienor to another, who uses it in violation of the law, is not a violation
of due process for ".

.

. certain uses of property may be regarded as

so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril." 39
In an attack on the constitutionality of Section 782, a claimant
contended that the law was beyond the scope of congressional powel
and was a mere police regulation. The court held that the close relationship between this Section and the tax laws caused it to fall under
the same constitutional approbation as other provisions of the antinarcotics laws. 40 Further, the court pointed out that since transportation is an aid to tax evasion, a law aimed at hindering transport has
tax collection as its purpose. 4 '
34 See United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 26 L. Ed. 246, 249 (1881).
35 Ibid. Accord: United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 574, 51 S. Ct.
278, 75 L. Ed. 551 (1931).
36 E.g., Logan v. United States, 260 Fed. 746, 748-9 (5th Cir. 1919).
37 Id., 260 Fed. at 749.
38 272 U.S. 465, 47 S. Ct. 133, 71 L. Ed. 354 (1926).
39 Id., 272 U.S. at 467. See also United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile,
272 U.S. 321, 47 S. Ct. 154, 71 L. Ed. 279 (1926); General Finance Co. of

Louisiana v. United States, 45 F. (2d) 380 (5th Cir. 1930).
40 United States v. Childs, 43 F. Supp. 776, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1942).
41

Cf. United States v. One 1937 Hudson Terraplane Coup6 Automobile,

21 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ky. 1937). It is not necessary to show that the United

NOTES
The importance of the decisions holding forfeiture proceedings to
be in rem 42 is underscored in the attacks upon the constitutionality
of Section 782. That the claimant is an innocent owner, lienor, or
43
for the action is
mortgagee is immaterial under this principle,
brought against the vehicle, not the owner. Furthermore, the acquittal
or conviction is no bar because the parties are not the same. In the
forfeiture action it is the car that is proceeded against, not its owner.
Therefore, there is no readjudication. Since the defense of double
jeopardy is proper only when the same individual is placed on trial
for a second time in criminal actions for the same offense, the in rem
nature of the proceeding defeats that contention.4 4 The objection, on
constitutional grounds, that forfeiture of a vehicle owned by an innocent
third party deprives him of property without due process is also
weakened by cases ruling that the proceeding is against the vehicle, not
its owner. The owner is not deprived of his property, but rather, in
theory, the object redresses the Government for the injury it has
caused.
The principles discussed previously are well established in forfeiture
cases. However, most of the decisions cited concerned statutes other
than that presently under consideration. There has been little litigation of such matters under 49 U.S.C. § 782. One of the few cases is
United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe,45 where the district court,
in considering a libel47for the forfeiture brought for transporting coun46
terfeit coins, said:
This is a proceeding in rem, against the car, in which the law
ascribes to it a power of complicity and guilt in the offense. And in the
light of the authorities, it is now too late to attempt a construction
of the statutes here involved as exempting from forfeiture the interest
of a person in a chattel for the reason that he was guiltless. It is no
longer necessary to quote in support of this well established doctrine the
common law as to deodands or the Mosaic law as to the punishment in-flicted upon an ox which gores a man.

Therefore the claims of an innocent lienor and owner were denied and
the claimants were left to the remedy of an appeal to the Secretary
of the Treasury for remission or mitigation.
States was actually deprived of revenue. Bush v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 709,
710 (5th Cir. 1927).
42 United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 47 S. Ct.
154, 71 L. Ed. 279 (1926); also see footnote 13 supra.
43 Busic v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 794, 795 (4th Cir. 1945).
44 United States v. One Saxon Automobile, 257 Fed. 251 (4th Cir. 1919);
United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 88 F. Supp. 93, 97 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
45 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
46 Defined as contraband in 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 781 (3) (1946)
and within the provisions of 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1946).
47 United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788, 790 (D. Mass.
1941).
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Another decision under 49 U.S.C. § 782 in dicta declared a prior
acquittal or conviction to be irrelevant. 48 The lienor's lack of knowledge, in view of the rule that the proceeding is in rem, was no defense.
This also has been considered in dicta. 49 Likewise, the fact that the
Act is an extension of the deodand doctrine 50 and that a forfeiture
under it involves no denial of due process, even though the claimant
is innocent, has been similarly noted. 51 The principle of the Coffey
case was by-passed in United States v. Physic.52 The court held that
an acquittal of the owner of the automobile was not res judicata with
regard to the issues involved in a forfeiture proceeding since the
innocence of the owner would be no defense to the libel.
IV.
Much of the litigation under Section 782 has involved the definitions of some of its terms and a clarification of its remedies. Section
787 53 provides that the term "vehicle"
... includes every description of carriage or other contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as means of transportation on, below, or above
the land, but does not include aircraft....

Biasotti v. Clarke 54 held that a house trailer, which served as a
residence, being connected to sewer, water and electricity lines, but
which had carried narcotics, was a vehicle because it had been used
to facilitate transportation. 55 The claimant had argued that the house
trailer was a home and not a vehicle.
No little confusion has developed in cases construing the term
"facilitate." The courts have agreed 56 with the rule in Pon Wing
Quong v. United States 57 that to "facilitate" is to make "less difficult"
or "easy"; perplexities arise when application of these definitions to
specific cases is sought.
48 United States v. One 1949 Lincoln Coupe Auto, 93 F. Supp. 666, 669
(W.D. Mich. 1950).
49 E.g., United States v. One (1) Oldsmobile Sedan, 75 F. Supp. 83, 86
(E.D. La. 1948); United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan, 73 F. Supp. 88,
89-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
50 A common law doctrine under which an instrumentality or animal which
had caused the death of a human was tried, convicted and destroyed because of
its role in the death. See SALMOND, JURISPRUDFNCE 431 (7th ed. 1924); SEAorz,
TuE HISTORY oF LAw 126 (1946).
51 E.g., United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan, 73 F. Supp. 88, 90
(E.D.N.Y. 1946).
52 175 F. (2d) 338 (2d Cir. 1949).
53 53 STAT. 1292 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 787 (1946).
54 51 F. Supp. 608 (D. R.I. 1943).
55
Under this definition anything capable of containing narcotics and of
moving, or being moved, would seem to be a vehicle. The court commented, ibid.,
on the harshness of the law, but said it must follow the definition Congress
had set down.
56 E.g., Platt v. United States, 163 F. (2d) 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1947).
57 111 F. (2d) 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1940).

NOTES
In United States v. One Dodge Coupe,58 the car was driven to a
location where the driver parked it, entered another vehicle and drove
away. Later he returned and proceeded toward the parked car. Before
re-entering it, he was apprehended and heroin was found in a parcel
which he had brought from the second car. The parked automobile
was charged with facilitating the violation. Forfeiture was decreed
because in carrying the driver a portion of the distance to the narcotics,
the car made it less difficult for him to secure them.
Apparently to mitigate the harshness of the above orthodox rule,
the court in Platt v. United States 59 established a semantic distinction
not expressly called for in Section 784. The issue before the court was
whether the family car, driven by an addicted daughter to a nearby
drugstore where she purchased morphine, was used to "facilitate" the
violation of the narcotics laws. The court, in dismissing the Government's forfeiture proceeding, held that the use of the car did not make
the actual purchase easier or remove any hindrance from the sale. It
reasoned that the car ". . . was merely the means of locomotion by
which . . . [the addict] went to the store to make the purchase," 60

and that the consummation of the sale was not affected by the means
the place of purchase. 6 1 This decision has been
employed to reach
62
followed in dicta.
In support of Platt, perhaps because it recognized Platt's equitable
result, the court in United .States v. One 1941 Pontiac Sedan 63 added
further rationalization to buttress that decision. This was based on
the ground that the automobile in the Platt case was used by an
addict and not by a narcotics peddler, as it was in the One Dodge
Coupe case. The rationale offered for this distinction was the value
of the auto to the peddler in enabling him to avoid discovery and
detection: 64
He can travel greater distances, follow less frequented streets or roads,
move about at will and alone, and be completely independent of public
It is an operating tool of the dope peddler's
means of conveyance ....
trade.

This distinction was likewise followed in United States v. Ford Coupe
Automobile 65 where the court also emphasized the calculated action
of the claimant there - a peddler, as compared to the innocent act
58
59
60

43 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
163 F. (2d) 165 (10th Cir. 1947).

Id. at 167.

61 The court commented, ibid., that such construction was necessary to avoid
ruling the statute unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and uncertainty.
62 United States v. One 1949 Ford Sedan, 96 F. Supp. 341, 343-4 (W.D.
N.C. 1951).
63 83 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
64 Id. at 1002.
65 83 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
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of the mother in Platt who unwittingly provided her daughter with
the means for accomplishing a breach of the law.
The distinction serves justice, but there is no basis in the statute
for distinguishing between the use of a vehicle by an addict and the
use by a peddler. The law provides that a vehicle which facilitates a
violation of the narcotics law shall be forfeited 66 and the acts of both
addict and peddler are violations of the law. Also, it is difficult to
comprehend the foundation for the distinction between "facilitation"
and "locomotion"; locomotion is merely a species of facilitation. Apparently the decisive factor in the above cases has been the degree of
participation67 in the violation. However, the statute does not provide
for degrees.
The injustice which can arise in forfeiture cases is intimated in
United States v. One 1949 Ford Sedan.6 8 The owner of the auto allowed his brother to use it on a day on which the brother was later
proved to have violated the narcotics laws. The brother was seen
driving the car. Several days later, the owner traded the car to an
innocent third party, in exchange for another car. Forfeiture proceedings were brought against the car in the hands of the third party.
The libel was unsuccessful because the evidence failed to positively
link the use of the car to the violation, but the case demonstrates
possible injustices.
Under the liquor law enacted in 1935,69 district courts are empowered in forfeiture proceedings to remit or mitigate in favor of an
innocent and unknowing owner. A lienor or mortgagee who has made
a preliminary investigation of the reputation of the car owner in
accord with the requirements of the liquor statute, likewise has a
remedy in the district courts.
Section 784 70 of the Act incorporates the remedies applicable under
the customs laws. But, unlike the present liquor laws, remission and
mitigation under the customs law are matters of grace, not of right.7 1
66

53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1946).

67

The court in the Platt case, 163 F. (2d) at 167, limited application of

the term "facilitation" to a situation in which direct aid to the transfer of the
goods is provided by the vehicle. An acceptance of so narrow a definition could
logically require courts to decide that a car used in carrying an addict to the
situs of the transaction, however distant, was a mere means of locomotion and
did not make the purchase less difficult. If this distinction were followed,
facilitation would seem to be impossible save in unusual situations where, for
example, the headlights of the vehicle are used to illumine the scene of the
transaction.
68 96 F. Supp. 341 (W-). N.C. 1951). As to when forfeiture takes place
see The Harpoon II, 71 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Mass. 1947); United States v. One
Oldsmobile Sedan, 23 F. Supp. 323 (D. Ore. 1938).
69 18 U.S.C. § 646 (1946).
70 53 STAT. 1292 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 784 (1946).
71 The Olympia, 58 F. (2d) 638, 641 (D. Conn. 1932).

NOTES
The district courts under this law have no power to remit or mitigate.
72
The sole authority to do so is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury.
Furthermore, the courts have no authority to release the car on bond
pendente lite.73 In United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan 74 the
court said:
I admit that on the argument of this motion I expressed unwillingness
to believe that the forfeiture laws are as harsh as . . . they are. But
analysis of the cases demonstrates, at least to me, that the claimant has
no remedy in this Court even if he is innocent.

Section 782 provides an exception for a car acquired in violation of
the criminal law; in this circumstance forfeiture is denied the Government. Interesting cases have arisen under this provision. In United
States v. One 1941 Chrysler Brougham Sedan,75 a car was obtained
from an automobile rental service after an agreement was signed that
it would not be used in violation of federal laws. It was subsequently
used to violate the narcotics laws. The court denied the owner's claim
that a car so obtained by the bailee was taken from him in a manner
entitling him to benefit from the exception. The court distinguished
between false pretenses and larceny, and held the former to be no
grounds for dismissal.
In United States v. One 1938 Chevrolet Coach Automobile, 76 the
owner claimed that her husband, the user of the car, while he was
intoxicated and in a stupor, allowed two men to drive it. The strangers
were arrested and narcotics found in their possession. The court ruled
the husband's condition negatived consent; therefore the car had been
taken without consent and in violation of the criminal law.
Conclusion
The necessity of the forfeiture provision, as pointed out by Representative Robertson in the Report of the House Ways and Means
Committee, 77 cannot be denied. It is doubtful, however, that the law
need be as harsh as it is. The liquor laws make remission a matter of
right in the case of innocent third parties and vest power of remission
in the district courts. There seems to be no reason why Section 784
cannot be amended to accomplish the same result.
The forfeiture provision under discussion is not here condemned,
but only the remedies it provides, or rather fails to provide. An appeal
72 See United States v. Andrade, 181 F. (2d) 42 (9th Cir. 1950), and United
States v. One Oldsmobile Club Coupe 1939 Model, 33 F. Supp. 848 (D. Conn.
1940), where remission under a statute similar to 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1946) was considered.
73 United States v. Heckinger, 163 F. (2d) 472, 474 (2d Cir. 1947).
74 73 F. Supp. 88, 89 (ED. N.Y. 1946); accord, United States v. One 1940

Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
76 74 F. Supp. 970 (ED. Mich. 1947).
76 78 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. S.C. 1948).
77 H.R. REP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).

